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ABSTRACT : The present article aims to offer a critique of the
recent efforts to regulate hedge funds in the EU and illustrate
the shortcomings of the EU’s regulatory spree in the field of
hedge fund regulation. The analysis suggests that the adoption
of the AIFM Directive was not preceded by any thoughtful
analysis of the risks emanating from the hedge fund industry
but was rather the culmination of the EU’s leading Member
States, namely France’s and Germany’s, desire to impose a
stricter regulatory regime on hedge funds. The rationales
underpinning the adoption of the Directive are the protection
of investors and the safeguarding of financial stability. On the
one hand, the mandatory investor protection provisions of the
Directive impose unnecessary costs to hedge funds managers
and sophisticated investors who are unable to enter into
mutually beneficial bargains. On the other hand, the provisions
of the Directive seeking to tackle systemic risk utterly fail their
goal to safeguard financial stability.
I. Introduction
Hedge funds gained prominence in the late 1980s in part due
to the phenomenal success of prominent global macro mana-
gers such as George Soros, Julian Robertson and Paul Tudor
Jones, which were able to generate impressive returns by
speculating on global macroeconomic trends.1 Soros’ large
bet against the British pound, which forced the UK to exit the
Exchange Rate Mechanism and devalue its currency, esta-
blished hedge funds as a powerful force in the global financial
system able to move markets.2 The Asian financial crisis of
1997 was the next worrying incident with hedge funds critici-
zed for speculating against the currencies of Asian countries
and provoking a severe financial crisis gripping much of Asia.3
The near-collapse of Long-Term Capital Management
(hereinafter “LCTM”) and its rescue under the auspices of
the Federal Reserve vividly illustrated the potential contribu-
tion of the hedge fund industry to systemic risk. Even though
these episodes were followed by calls for tighter regulation of
the hedge fund industry, market mechanisms such as indirect
regulation via prime brokers were considered by regulators to
be the optimal solution to the risks emanating from hedge
fund activities in financial markets.4
However, the recent financial crisis and the still unfolding
sovereign debt crisis put the failures of the previous European
but also global financial regulatory architecture in the spotli-
ght. Hedge funds were one of the first targets of regulators in
the US and the EU in their efforts to repair the broken
financial system. In light of the perceived role of hedge funds
in aggravating the financial and sovereign debt crisis, 5 regu-
lators hastily moved forward with their ambitious plans to
directly regulate the hedge fund industry. The Dodd-Frank
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (hereinaf-
ter “Dodd-Frank Act”)6 in the US and the Directive 2011/61/
EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June
2011 on Alternative Investment Fund Managers (hereinafter
“AIFM Directive”)7 in the EU bring hedge funds under the
regulatory radar and impose on them a variety of onerous
regulatory requirements, which are expected to radically
transform the industry.
The AIFM Directive was adopted on November 2011 after a
long and heated fight between the UK and the hedge fund
industry, on the one side and Germany and France on the
other. The Directive’s main goals are the creation of a harmo-
nized Pan-European regulatory regime for hedge funds and
an internal market for the managing and marketing of funds.
The basic rationales underpinning the adoption of the Direc-
tive are the protection of investors in hedge funds and the
safeguarding of financial stability. Nonetheless, it has attrac-
ted harsh criticism for raising the costs of hedge funds opera-
ting in Europe and impeding the development of a robust
European hedge fund industry. In light of the growing debate
revolving around the costs and benefits of the AIFM Direc-
tive, the present article aims to offer a critique of the recent
efforts to regulate hedge funds in the EU and illustrate the
shortcomings of the EU’s regulatory spree in the field of
hedge fund regulation.
The article will proceed as follows. Part II offers an introduc-
tion to the hedge fund phenomenon and the main rationales
for hedge fund regulation upon which proponents of stricter
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1 George Soros famously summarized the philosophy underlying his macro-
investment style by saying “I don’t play the game by a particular set of
rules, I look for changes in the rules of the game.” See G. Soros, Soros on
Soros Staying Ahead of the Curve (John Wiley and Sons 1995), at p. 19.
2 D. Litterick, “Billionaire Who Broke the Bank of England”, The Tele-
graph, 13 September 2002, available at : <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/
finance/2773265/Billionaire-who-broke-the-Bank-of-England.html>
(accessed 16 April 2013).
3 However, empirical studies have found that the criticism against hedge
funds was unfounded. See S. Brown, W. Goetzmann & J. Park., “Hedge
Funds and the Asian Currency Crisis of 1997” (1998) National Bureau of
Economic Research, Working Paper No. 6427.
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
4 See for instance the conclusions of the Report of the President’s Working
Group on Financial Markets examining the causes of the failure of Long-
Term Capital Management, the risks posed by hedge funds and potential
regulatory responses. The President’s Working Group on Financial Mar-
kets, Report of the President’s Working Group on Financial Markets :
Hedge Funds, Leverage and the Lessons of Long-Term Capital Manage-
ment (April 1999).
5 See T. Corrigan, “Attacking Speculators is a Good Bet for Troubled
Politicians” Daily Telegraph 12 March 2010, available at : <http://
www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/financialcrisis/7423145/Attacking-
speculators-is-a-good-bet-for-troubled-politicians.html> (accessed 16
March 2013).
6 Title IV of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act, Pub Law No. 111-203 (2010).
7 Directive 2011/61/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8
June 2011 on Alternative Investment Fund Managers and Amending
Directives 2003/41/EC and 2009/65/EC and Regulations (EC) No. 1060/
2009 and (EU) No. 1095/2010 [2011] O.J. L 174/1.
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regulation make their case for regulatory intervention. Part
III analyzes the main provisions of the AIFM Directive appli-
cable to hedge funds. Part IV offers an overall assessment of
the Directive adopting a rather critical approach towards the
EU’s regulatory spree while Part V concludes.
II. Hedge funds and the case for
regulatory intervention
Despite the constant growth of the hedge fund industry and
the attention that it has attracted from regulators, politicians
and investors, hedge funds lack a formal and universally
accepted definition.8 Nonetheless, they share common struc-
tural and organizational characteristics allowing their distinc-
tion from other popular investment vehicles such as private
equity and mutual funds. First and foremost, hedge funds
offer investors absolute returns unlike mutual funds whose
performance is evaluated against some market benchmark.9
The unique compensation structure of hedge fund managers
consisting typically of a management fee ranging from 1 % to
2 % of assets under management and an incentive fee usually
fixed at 20 % of the fund’s profits further enhances the incen-
tives of managers to pursue absolute returns.10 Managerial
co-investments in the funds are an additional powerful device
for aligning the interests between managers and investors.11
What is more, due to the absence of regulatory constraints,
hedge funds are able to engage in highly sophisticated invest-
ment techniques such as the employment of leverage and
short selling.12 Furthermore, hedge funds are predominantly
open only to sophisticated investors subject to high minimum
investment requirements.13 Finally, in contrast to private
equity funds, which make long-term investments in illiquid
securities, 14 hedge funds mostly employ short-term invest-
ment strategies concentrating their investment activities in
the public markets.15
Hedge funds adopt a variety of heterogeneous investment
strategies further complicating the efforts to reach to an accu-
rate definition. One can group hedge fund strategies into four
broad categories : long/short, arbitrage and relative value
strategies, event-driven strategies and directional strate-
gies.16 Long/short strategies involve a long position in an
undervalued security and a short position in an overvalued
one. They also form the basis for arbitrage and relative value
strategies, which seek to exploit mispricings in closely related
securities.17 Event-driven strategies focus on extraordinary
events in a corporation’s lifetime such as bankruptcies, spin-
offs and mergers and acquisitions. Hedge funds seek to
exploit price fluctuations stemming from these events.18
Finally, directional strategies capitalize on anticipated market
movements. Managers of hedge funds profit by analyzing
macroeconomic and geopolitical developments and taking
bets across a variety of markets including foreign exchange,
commodities and bond markets.
The operation of hedge funds in financial markets brings
considerable benefits to their depth, liquidity and efficiency.
Hedge funds’ constant trading in financial markets provides
liquidity to the financial system especially during adverse
market circumstances.19 Furthermore, by engaging in arbi-
trage, namely buying unvalued securities and shorting over-
valued ones, hedge funds improve the efficiency of markets.
In addition, by virtue of their complex investment strategies
seeking to reduce exposure to market risk, they offer diversi-
fication to investors.20 What is more, shareholder activism as
practiced by hedge funds, leads to substantial benefits for
investors and target companies.21
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
8 Various working definitions have been proposed. For instance the Presi-
dent’s Working Group on Financial Markets described hedge funds as
“any pooled investment vehicle that is privately organized, administered by
professional investment managers, and not widely available to the public”.
See The President’s Working Group on Financial Markets, supra no. 4, at
p. 1. Nonetheless, this definition is too broad capturing not only hedge
funds but also other alternative investment vehicles such as private equity
and venture capital funds. Hedge funds in the US and the UK are usually
organized as limited partnerships with investors in the fund becoming
limited partners. The hedge fund manager acting as a general partner will
be responsible for managing the fund and making investment decisions.
Limited partners are prohibited from interfering with the management of
the fund and are subject to limits on their ability to withdraw their capital.
See F. Lhabitant, Handbook of Hedge Funds (John Wiley and Sons 2006),
at pp. 29, 85-90.
9 Financial Services Authority, Hedge Funds : A Discussion of Risk and
Regulatory Engagement (DP 05/04), at p. 10.
10 S. Lederman, Hedge Fund Regulation (2nd ed., Practicing Law Institute
2012), at para. 2:2.3.
11 Agarwal, Daniel & Naik estimate that the mean (median) managerial
ownership is 7.1 % (2.4 %) of hedge fund assets under management.
V. Agarwal, N. Daniel and N. Naik, “Role of Managerial Incentives and
Hedge Fund Performance”, 64 Journal of Finance (2009) p. 2221, at
p. 2231.
12 In contrast, regulations both in the US and the EU severely restrict the
ability of mutual funds to engage in short-selling, derivatives trading and
leveraged investing. See H.B. Shadab, “Fending for Themselves : Creating
a U.S. Hedge Fund Market for Retail Investors”, 11 New York University
Journal of Legislation and Public Policy (2008) p. 251, at p. 283 & P. Atha-
nassiou, Hedge Fund Regulation in the European Union : Current Trends
and Future Prospects (Kluwer Law International 2009), at pp. 107-114.
13 For an overview of US regulations restricting the offering of hedge fund
unit to sophisticated investors see H.B Shadab, “The Law and Economics
of Hedge Funds : Financial Innovation and Investor Protection”, 6 Berke-
ley Business Law Journal (2009) p. 243, at pp. 257-259. Furthermore, pur-
suant to the AIFM Directive the marketing of hedge funds should be
directed solely to sophisticated investors. Nonetheless, individual Member
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
States may allow the offering of hedge funds to retail investors. Article 43
of the AIFM Directive.
14 J. A. McCahery & E. P.M. Vermeulen, Corporate Governance of Non-
Listed Companies (OUP 2008), at p. 171.
15 However, recent years have seen hedge funds and in particular hedge fund
activists making long-term investments in public companies seeking to
strengthen their corporate governance. See H. B. Shadab, “Coming
Together After the Crisis : Global Convergence of Private Equity and
Hedge Funds”, 29 Northwestern Journal of International Law and Business
(2009), p. 603.
16 For an overview of the different hedge fund strategies, see F. LHabitant,
Hedge Funds : Myths and Limits (John Wiley and Sons 2002), at pp. 77-
121.
17 A popular category is fixed income arbitrage where the trader seeks to
profit from mispricings between closely related fixed income securities
such as government or corporate bonds. Ibid., at p. 92-93.
18 For instance, securities of firms in bankruptcy often trade below their
fundamental value due to investor risk aversion and/or irrationality and
legal rules which require institutional investors to hold highly rated secu-
rities. Hedge funds engaging in distressed investing seek to profit from the
market’s undervaluation of the securities. Ibid., at pp. 99-114.
19 Aragon and Strahan find that stocks held by Lehman connected funds
which suffered substantial losses as a result of Lehman’s bankruptcy,
suffered larger drops in liquidity than stocks not held by these funds during
the last quarter of 2008. See G. O. Aragon & P. Strahan, “Hedge Funds as
Liquidity Providers : Evidence from the Lehman Bankruptcy” (Septem-
ber 2009) National Bureau of Economic Research Working, Paper No.
15336.
20 Shadab, supra no. 13, at p. 263.
21 See L. Bebchuk, A. Brav and W. Jiang, “The Long-Term Effects of Hedge
Fund Activism” (2013) Columbia Business School Research Paper No.
13-66.
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Despite the benefits that hedge funds offer to financial mar-
kets, proponents of hedge fund regulation frequently invoke
the dangers that hedge funds pose to market integrity, finan-
cial stability and investor protection in order to justify a
stricter regulatory regime.22 Market integrity concerns
revolve around the propensity of hedge funds to engage in
market abuse and insider trading.23 Nonetheless, market
abuse and insider trading are not specific to the hedge fund
industry but are common phenomena in the marketplace for
which an adequate legal regime is in place in virtually all
developed economies.24 The protection of investors is ano-
ther commonly invoked rationale for regulating hedge
funds.25 The major fallacy of the investor protection rationale
is that investors in hedge funds are sophisticated having both
the expertise and the bargaining power to adequately protect
their interests.26 In a time when regulators around the world
are faced with shrinking budgets, allocating resources to
investors who are able to fend for themselves hampers the
ability of regulators to achieve their fundamental objective,
namely the protection of retail investors.27
In contrast to investor protection and market integrity
concerns, the contribution of the hedge fund industry to sys-
temic risk forms a sound rationale for regulating hedge funds.
Hedge funds contribute to systemic risk via two channels.
Systemic risk manifests itself the credit channel when the
failure of an individual (or multiple) fund(s) imposes signifi-
cant losses on creditors and counterparties such as prime
brokers.28 The market channel refers to the situation when
adverse market movements cause an abrupt withdrawal of
credit and investor capital forcing hedge funds to liquidate
their positions in order to meet creditors’ and investors’
demands.29 Widespread liquidations exert downward pres-
sure on asset prices amplifying investor redemptions and the
tightening of credit leading to further liquidations. This
vicious cycle of forced sales at dislocated prices may cause a
complete breakdown of financial markets.30 These risks
almost materialized in the case of LTCM, which was rescued
by a consortium of its creditors under the auspices of the
Federal Reserve.31 The rescue was prompted by fears that
LTCM’s failure would cause significant losses to its counter-
parties and the rapid unwinding of LTCM’s positions would
lead to widespread dislocations in financial markets.32
III. The AIFM directive : europe’s
regulatory response
The final text of the AIFM Directive was adopted after hea-
ted and prolonged negotiations with a record of 1669 amend-
ments proposed by Members of the European Parliament to
the original draft directive.33 The Directive creates a harmo-
nized Pan-European regulatory framework for alternative
investment fund managers (hereinafter “AIFMs”) and an
internal market for their activities.34 It should be noted that
the Directive does not directly target alternative investment
funds (hereinafter “AIFs”). The requirements of the Direc-
tive are applicable to AIFMs established in the EU managing
or marketing one or more AIFs irrespective of whether they
are EU based or not and non-EU AIFMs managing EU AIFs
or marketing AIFs in the EU, EU-based or not.35
The definition of an AIFM encompasses any legal person
managing AIFs as a regular business.36Furthermore, an AIF
is defined as any collective investment undertaking, which
raises capital from multiple investors for the purpose of inves-
ting it pursuant to a defined investment policy and does not
require authorization pursuant to article 5 of Directive 2009/
65/EC.37 As a result, the Directive is applicable to a wide
variety of investment vehicles, including managers of private
equity funds, hedge funds, real estate funds and commodity
funds. An AIFM falling under the ambit of the Directive must
be authorized by the competent authorities of its home Mem-
ber State and comply with all the requirements of the Direc-
tive.38 An exception is granted for AIFMs managing levera-
ged AIFs with less than 100 million assets or less than
500 million if the funds do not use leverage and do not allow
investor redemptions for the first five years.39 The rationales
behind the complex and burdensome requirements set by the
AIFM Directive are the protection of investors and the tac-
kling of systemic risk.
Provisions aimed at the protection of investors include exten-
sive conduct of business, valuation, depositary and disclosure
requirements. Managers of hedge funds must implement
organizational and administrative arrangements for identi-
fying and managing any conflicts of interests that could adver-
sely impact the interests of the AIFs that they manage or the
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
22 Lederman, supra no. 10, Ch. 3.
23 See C. Noyer, “Hedge Funds : What are the Main Issues”, 10 Banque
de France, Financial Stability Review (2007) p. 105, at pp. 107-108.
24 Ibid.
25 F. Edwards, “The Regulation of Hedge Funds : Financial Stability and
Investor Protection” in Theodor Baums and Andreas Cahn (eds), Hedge
Funds, Risks and Regulation (De Gruyter Recht 2004) p. 30-51, at p. 30.
26 T. Paredes, “On the Decision to Regulate Hedge Funds : The SEC’s
Regulatory Philosophy, Style and Mission”, 5 University of Illinois Law
Review (2006) p. 975, at pp. 990-997. Institutional investors such as pension
funds, endowments, funds of hedge funds represent the largest source of
capital for hedge funds. Preqin Global Investors, Preqin Global Investors
Report : Hedge Funds (2012), at pp. 12-15.
27 See for instance D. C. Langevoort, “The SEC, Retail Investors, and the
Institutionalization of the Securities Markets”, 95 Virginia Law Review
(2009) p. 1025, at pp. 1025-1026 noting that the SEC’s core mission has
historically been the protection of retail investors as opposed to institutio-
nal investors.
28 L. Dixon, N. Clancy & K. Kumar, Hedge Funds and Systemic Risk (Rand
Corporation, 2012), at p. 4.
29 A. Shleifer & R. Vishny, “Fire Sales in Finance and Macroeconomics”,
25 Journal of Economic Perspectives (2011) p. 29, at pp. 35-38.
30 Ibid., at pp. 38-43.
31 See R. Lowenstein, When Genius Failed : The Rise and Fall of Long-Term
Capital Management (Random House Trade Paperbacks 2001) for an
account of LCTM’s rise and eventual demise.
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
32 See F. Edwards, “Hedge Funds and the Collapse of Long-Term Capital
Management”, 13 Journal of Economic Perspectives (1999) p. 189, at
pp. 201-204.
33 J. Baird & G. Black, “Amendments Clog EU AIFM Directive Debate :
The political backdrop is also evolving rapidly”, The Hedge Fund Journal
(March 2010).
34 Arts. 1 & 2 of the AIFM Directive.
35 Art. 2 of the AIFM Directive.
36 Art. 4(1)(b) of the AIFM Directive.
37 Directive 2009/65/EC commonly referred to as UCITS Directive (Under-
taking for Collective Investment in Transferable Securities) governs
undertakings for collective investments which collect investor capital from
the public, operate according to the principle of risk spreading, invest in
only securities and financial investments referred to in article 50(1) of the
UCITS Directive and allow investor to redeem their units upon request
and without any restrictions.
38 Art. 6(1) of the AIFM Directive.
39 The second exception applies essentially to private equity funds. Art. 3 of
the AIFM Directive.
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funds’ investors.40The AIFM must act with due care, skill and
diligence and in the interests of the investors in the AIFs and
the integrity of the market.41 Furthermore, the Directive’s
provisions require AIFMs to adhere to heightened depositary
and valuation standards. Pursuant to article 21 a single depo-
sitary responsible for safekeeping the fund’s assets and moni-
toring cash flows must be appointed for each fund under
management.42 In addition, the Directive introduces a near
strict liability regime for depositaries which shall be liable for
the loss of any financial instrument in their custody or held by
any third party to whom a custody has been delegated except
if the loss can be attributed to an external event beyond the
depositary’s reasonable control and only if all reasonable
precautions to avoid the loss were taken.43 With respect to the
valuation of assets, fund managers must ensure that an inde-
pendent valuation of fund assets takes place at least once per
year.44
Disclosure requirements towards investors are a cornerstone
of the European Union’s policy of enhancing the transpa-
rency of the industry. Transparency requirements include the
obligation of fund managers to disclose specific information
to investors both prior to their investment and periodically
thereafter.45 Furthermore, pursuant to article 22 an audited
annual report with respect to each fund managed and/or
marketed in the EU must be available to investors on
request.46 Finally, the Directive imposes modest initial and
ongoing capital requirements for AIFMs subject to an overall
cap of EUR 10 million while in order to cover potential
professional liability risks managers of funds must either have
additional own funds appropriate to cover the potential risks
or hold a professional indemnity insurance.47
The AIFM Directive was adopted based on the belief that
hedge fund activities had a destabilizing effect on markets
during the twin financial and sovereign debt crises. As a
result, the Directive contains a wide array of provisions aimed
at safeguarding financial stability. Hedge fund managers must
devise and implement appropriate risk and liquidity manage-
ment systems.48 In addition, AIFMs must establish and apply
remuneration policies that promote sound risk management
and do not encourage excessive risk-taking.49 Remuneration
restrictions are also introduced for “identified staff” whose
professional activities have a material impact on the fund’s
risk profile.50 Furthermore, mandatory reporting require-
ments will allow national supervisors to assess the systemic
risk posed by the activities of hedge funds. AIFMs must
report regularly to regulatory authorities information on the
main markets that their funds trade, their principal exposures,
their risk and liquidity profiles and the details about the level
of leverage if employed on a substantial basis.51 The Directive
obliges AIFMs to introduce leverage limits with respect to
each AIF they manage while national supervisory authorities
may impose limits in order to ensure financial stability.52
A positive aspect of the Directive is the introduction of a
Pan-European passporting regime for AIFMs’ management
and marketing activities. AIFMs based in the EU are allowed
to manage EU funds across the EU and market them to EU
professional investors.53 EU-based AIFMs authorized pur-
suant to the provisions of the Directive may also manage
non-EU AIFs.54Until the European Commission allows the
extension of the passporting provisions which is expected to
take effect in 2015, the passporting regime will not be availa-
ble to EU-based AIFMs marketing non-EU AIFs and non-
EU AIFMs marketing EU or non-EU based AIFs in the EU.
55 As a result, their marketing activities to EU professional
investors will have to be conducted according to national
private placement regimes.
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
40 Art. 14 of the AIFM Directive.
41 Art. 9(1)(a)-(c) of the AIFM Directive.
42 Art. 21 of the AIFM Directive.
43 Art. 21(12) of the AIFM Directive.
44 Art. 19 of the AIFM Directive.
45 Art. 23 of the AIFM Directive.
46 Art. 22 of the AIFM Directive. The same report must also be made
available to supervisory authorities.
47 Art. 9 of the AIFM Directive.
48 Arts. 15 & 22 of the AIFM Directive. One should note that the particular
requirements can be viewed both from an investor protection and a
financial stability perspective. However, the predominant rationale behind
the adoption of these particular requirements was the protection of finan-
cial stability. Heightened liquidity management requirements respond to
the risks of a run by investors and creditors. Indeed, during the financial
crisis hedge fund investors massively withdrew their capital forcing hedge
funds to sell their assets in a falling market. See U. Klebeck, ‘Liquidity
Management and Side Pockets in the Alternative Investment Fund Mana-
gers Directive’in Dirk Zetzsche (ed), The Alternative Investment Funds
Managers Directive, European Regulation of Alternative Investment Funds
(Kluwer Law International 2012) pp. 253-264, at pp. 253-254. On the other
hand, the weaknesses of internal control, governance mechanisms and risk
management that were revealed during the crisis of 2007-2008, have made
robust risk management in financial institutions an indispensable tool for
strengthening financial stability. See D. Zetzsche & D. Eckner, ‘Risk
Management in the Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive’in
D. Zetzsche (ed), The Alternative Investment Funds Managers Directive,
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
European Regulation of Alternative Investment Funds (Kluwer Law Inter-
national 2012), pp. 265-332, at p. 265.
49 Art. 13 & Annex II (1) of the AIFM Directive. Remuneration require-
ments can also be viewed both from a financial stability and an investor
protection perspective. Nonetheless, the provisions of the AIFM Directive
have been substantially influenced by the EU’s initiatives in the field of
remuneration policies for credit institutions in light of the role of executive
compensation in causing the financial crisis. Therefore, sound remunera-
tion practices are considered beneficial for enhancing financial stability.
See Paulo Camara, ‘The AIFM’s Governance and Remuneration Com-
mittees’ in Dirk Zetzsche (ed), The Alternative Investment Funds Mana-
gers Directive, European Regulation of Alternative Investment Funds
(Kluwer Law International 2012) pp. 237-252, at pp. 237, 241.
50 Ibid. Remuneration restrictions to “identified staff“ include requirements
for deferment of a minimum 40 %-60 % of variable remuneration and
payment of at least 50 % of variable remuneration in equity or equity-
linked instruments. See Annex II (1)(m) & (n) of the AIFM Directive.
Furthermore, the Directive mandates the introduction of remuneration
committees filled with non-executives subject to the principle of propor-
tionality. See Annex II (3) of the AIFM Directive.
51 Art. 24(1) of the AIFM Directive.
52 Art. 21 of the AIFM Directive.
53 Art. 32 of the AIFM Directive.
54 Art. 34 of the AIFM Directive.
55 Arts. 35-42 & 67(6) of the AIFM Directive. The extension of the passpor-
ting regime to non-EU alternative investment funds and managers and the
concomitant opening of the European market to foreign funds and mana-
gers was one of the most hotly contested issues during the negotiations
leading to the adoption of the Directive. See Stephen Fidler, “Hedge Fund
Talks : The End Game” The Wall Street Journal, 28 September 2010,
available at : <http://blogs.wsj.com/brussels/2010/09/28/hedge-fund-
directive-the-end-game> (accessed 16 November 2013).
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IV. An assessment of the AIFM
directive
In general, the AIFM Directive has been forcefully criticized
as a “political piece of law making”.56 Rather than responding
to the specific risks posed by the activities of each different
type of alternative investment vehicle falling under its ambit,
the Directive adopts a one size fits all approach imposing
uniform requirements on a diverse population of AIFMs. 57
Indeed, the adoption of the Directive is the culmination of
some Member States’, especially France’s and Germany’s, 58
longstanding desire to bring the hedge fund industry under
the regulatory radar with the other types of AIFMs being
swept along.59
Furthermore, a major concern that the provisions of the
AIFM Directive seek to alleviate is the perceived lack of
adequate protections for investors in hedge funds against
hedge fund managers’ opportunism. Various commentators
have argued that the opaque nature of the industry, the supe-
rior bargaining power of hedge fund managers and high infor-
mational asymmetries allow managers to reap significant
monetary benefits at the expense of their investors.60
Nonetheless, the reputational market for investment manage-
ment services is sufficiently robust ensuring the attention of
hedge fund managers to investor concerns.61 For instance,
investors conduct extensive due diligence prior to their
investments and during a fund’s life demanding information
on the fund’s risk, positions, strategy and compensation
arrangements.62 What is more, distinct features of fund mana-
gers’ compensation arrangements ensuring an alignment of
interests with investors such as managers’ co-investments in
the funds have been instituted after investor demand.63 There
is also substantial evidence that investors are able to bargain
substantial improvements in other areas as well such valua-
tion of the fund’s assets, an independent compliance function
and management of internal controls and conflicts.64 What is
more, even if one accepts investor protection as a sound
rationale for regulating hedge funds, the Directive contradicts
its own stated goal by exempting small hedge funds below
EUR 100 million from its requirements. The potential for
fraud is much more severe in small hedge funds with no prior
track record and unsophisticated internal controls.
In contrast to investor protection, the safeguarding of finan-
cial stability against systemic risk emanating from hedge fund
activities in financial markets forms a sound basis for regula-
ting hedge funds. The provisions of the Directive seek to curb
excessive risk-taking, ensure robust liquidity management in
order to prevent runs by fund investors and eliminate the
perverse incentives created by excessive and misaligned com-
pensation practices. However, hedge fund managers are
already implementing adequate safeguards against the abo-
vementioned risks making the provisions of the Directive
rather trivial.
Indeed, hedge fund managers responding to investor demand
implement robust risk management systems and controls,
which contribute to prudent risk-taking.65 What is more, the
hedge fund industry has been extremely creative in devising
mechanisms precluding catastrophic runs from investors.
Managers of hedge funds utilize a variety of liquidity mana-
gement tools including lock-ups, gates and side pockets.66
Lock-ups prevent investors from withdrawing their capital for
a minimum period after their investment usually set at one
year or longer while gates limit withdrawals to a specified
percentage of the fund’s overall capital.67 Furthermore, in
order to protect the value of illiquid investments from inves-
tor withdrawals, hedge fund managers increasingly use “side
pockets”. “Side pockets” are sub-accounts where illiquid
investments are placed. 68Investors are not able to redeem
their capital until the liquidation of the investments subject to
the “side pocket”.69
The recent financial crisis revealed severe weaknesses in the
design of compensation arrangements of executives in finan-
cial institutions. The structure of executive compensation
created incentives for excessive risk-taking.70 Boosting short-
term profits at the expense of long-term value became the
preferred strategy for executives of financial institutions who
were able to walk away with generous compensation packa-
ges and shift the losses from their institutions’ demise to
creditors, shareholders and taxpayers.71 Nonetheless, there is
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PriceWaterHouseCoopers, Transparency versus Returns : The Institutio-
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nance”, Stanford Journal of Law, Business and Finance (forthcoming
2013) p. 1, at p. 32.
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68 Ibid., at para. 2.3.3.E(1).
69 Ibid., at para. 2.3.3.E(1).
70 See generally L. Bebchuk & H. Spamann, “Regulating Bankers’ Pay”, 98
Georgetown Law Journal (2010) p. 247 & Financial Crisis Inquiry Com-
mission, The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report : Final Report of the National
Commission on the Causes of the Financial and Economic Crisis in the
United States (2011).
71 See Bebchuk, Cohen and Spamann who report that during the 2000-2008
period top executives at Bear Stearns were able to cash out large amounts
of performance-based compensation. The authors estimate that top exe-
cutives at Bear Stearns were able to walk away with compensation rea-
ching $1.4 billion while executives at Lehman Brothers derived cash flows
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no evidence that compensation in the alternative investment
fund management industry led to excessive risk-taking and
jeopardized financial stability. Executive compensation pro-
blems were prevalent in mainstream financial institutions
such as depositary banks, insurance companies and invest-
ment banks. In contrast, the unique structure of hedge fund
managers’ compensation consisting of a performance-based
fee of 20 % of the fund’s profits and a substantial
co-investment by the manager ensures prudent risk-taking
and an alignment of interests between investors and mana-
gers.72 What is more, the complex provisions introduced by
the Directive are more suitable for large publicly traded
institutions and not hedge funds the majority of which are
owner-managed small or midsized companies which do not
have sophisticated governance structures.73
Under the provisions of the AIFM Directive, AIFMs must
disclose a variety of information to national regulators who
are entrusted with the task of monitoring systemic risk. Addi-
tionally, national regulatory authorities are granted the
power to impose leverage limits in order to safeguard finan-
cial stability. While one should applaud the genuine desire of
European regulators to tackle systemic risk emanating from
hedge fund activities, the relevant provisions of the AIFM
Directive fail to achieve this goal. The national regulatory
authorities that are responsible for monitoring systemic risk
and imposing leverage limits do not have the relevant exper-
tise in assessing systemic risk and have an overall orientation
towards investor protection and conduct of business regula-
tion.74 Taking into account that financial crises are rare events
and a regulator’s success in safeguarding financial stability
cannot be easily observed, regulators charged both with a
financial stability and investor protection mandate will devote
their attention to investor protection. Regulators around the
world have recognized the perils of combining financial stabi-
lity supervision and investor protection in a single agency and
have moved towards the so-called “twin peaks” approach.75
Interestingly though, hedge fund regulation has been assi-
gned to national agencies predominantly charged with inves-
tor protection and business conduct supervision.
Furthermore, the AIFM Directive leaves the fragmentation
of hedge fund regulation across national lines intact. Home
regulators have the exclusive authority to regulate hedge
funds and monitor systemic risk. However, the global nature
of hedge fund activities creates systemic risk in markets other
than their home one. The objective of home regulators is to
ensure financial stability in their own market.76As a result,
they will not internalize the costs of increased systemic risk in
foreign markets. Additionally, home regulators seeking to
promote their financial industry have an incentive to adopt a
lenient stance towards domestic hedge funds posing risks
solely to the financial stability of foreign markets. In cases
where hedge funds create systemic risk to markets other than
their own, host regulators have no power to intervene leaving
them exposed to the actions of home regulators.77
V. Conclusion
The present article has attempted to assess the recently adop-
ted AIFM Directive, which creates a Pan-European regula-
tory framework for hedge fund managers. The analysis sug-
gests that the adoption of the Directive was not preceded by
any thoughtful analysis of the risks emanating from the hedge
fund industry but was rather the culmination of the EU’s
leading Member States, namely France’s and Germany’s,
desire to impose a stricter regulatory regime on hedge funds.
On the one hand, investor protection, a major rationale
underpinning the adoption of the Directive forms an unsound
basis for regulating hedge funds. On the other hand, the
AIFM Directive fails in safeguarding financial stability, a goal
that any modern regulatory framework for hedge funds
should strive to achieve. e
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
reaching $1 billion. L. Bebchuk, A. Cohen & H. Spamann, “The Wages of
Failure : Executive Compensation at Bear Stearns and Lehman 2000-
2008” 27 Yale Journal on Regulation (2010) p. 257.
72 See Shadab, supra no. 65, at pp. 36-39 ; Hedge Fund Standards Board,
Response to the ESMA Consultation Paper on Guidelines on Sound Remu-
neration Policies under AIFMD (27 September 2012), at pp. 1-2 & Awrey,
supra no. 58, at p. 17.
73 Alternative Investment Management Association, Response to ESMA’s
Consultation Paper-Guidelines on Sound Remuneration Policies under the
Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive (September 2012), at p. 1.
74 Squam Lake Working Group on Financial Regulation, A Systemic Regu-
lator for Financial Markets (May 2009), at p. 3. For instance, the regulators
responsible for the authorization of AIFMs and the monitoring of com-
pliance with the AIFM Directive are the Financial Conduct Authority in
the UK, the Autorité des marchés financiers in France and the Federal
Financial Supervisory Authority (BaFin) in Germany. See Financial
Conduct Authority, Implementation of the Alternative Investment Fund
Managers Directive (Policy Statement 13/5, June 2013), Kramer Levin,
Naftalis & Frankel LLP, Asset Management Update Regarding Recent
Regulations Affecting Asset Managers in France (July 2013) & Gibson
Dunn and Crutcher, Germany Adopts Capital Investment Act (KAGB) to
Implement the European AIFM Directive (22 July 2013).
75 See generally H. M. Vletter-van Dort, “Some Challenges Facing Euro-
pean Central Banks as Supervising Authority”, 9 European Company and
Financial Law Review (2012) p. 131.
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
76 See K. Pistor, “Host’s Dilemma : Rethinking EU Banking Regulation in
Light of the Global Crisis” in Grundmann Stefan et al. (eds), Festschrift für
Klaus J. Hopt zum 70. Geburtstag am 24. August 2010, Unternehmen,
Markt und Verantwortung (De Gruyter 2010) pp. 2339-2366, at pp. 2345-
2346.
77 In response to the perverse incentives created by national supervision in
the field of banking regulation, the European Union has moved forward
with transferring supervisory authority for Eurozone countries’ banking
institutions to the European Central Bank, which will become a suprana-
tional supervisor. EU countries whose currency is not the euro can also
decide to transfer supervisory authority to the European Central Bank.
See Council Regulation (EU) No. 1024/2013 of 15 October 2013 conferring
specific tasks on the European Central Bank concerning policies relating
to the prudential supervision of credit institutions L. 2287/63 & G. Ferra-
rini & L. Chiarella, “Common Banking Supervision in the Eurozone :
Strengths and Weaknesses” (2013), European Corporate Governance
Institute Working Paper No. 223/2010.
RTDF N° 2 - 2014 u DOCTRINE / Alexandros Seretakis 6
DOCTRINE
